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FORUM
Distinctions Without Differences:
Effects Bargaining In Light of First
National Maintenance *
Thomas C. Kohlert
The Supreme Court recently held that an employer has no duty to
bargain over its economically-motivated decision to close a part of its op-
erations. The Court, however, reafirmed that mitigation of the effects of
a partial closure upon a jeopardized workforce is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining. At best, decision bargaining merely entails em-
ployer consideration of union-suggested alternatives to partial termination
before making a final decision to close. As the duty to effects bargain is
broad in scope and attaches before an employer decides irrevocably to
terminate a part of its operations, the Court's exclusion of decision bar-
gainingfrom the ambit of mandatory bargaining will have a minimal im-
pact upon an employee representative's ability to bargain in effect about a
partial closure decision.
[Words are very rascals...'
In its recent decision in First National Maintenance v. NLRB,2 the
Supreme Court held that an employer's economically motivated deci-
sion to terminate a portion of its operations is not a mandatory subject
of bargaining.3 The Court stated, however, that there was "no dispute"
that the union representing the affected employees must be afforded "a
significant opportunity" to bargain with the employer "over the effects
of [such] a decision" and that this bargaining "must be conducted in a
meaningful manner and at a meaningful time."4 The Court's holding
abrogated the National Labor Relations Board's long established but
uncertainly applied rule that an employer who partially terminates its
operations has the duty to bargain over the decision to do so, as well as
* For his comments, suggestions and critcisms of earlier versions of this article-but
particularly for his encouragement--the author wishes to thank Professor Julius Getman.
t Research Fellow, Yale Law School.
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, TwELFrH NIor, Act III, scene L
2. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
3. Id at 686.
4. Id at 681-82.
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over the effects that will flow from the decision's implementation.5
On its face, First National Maintenance appears to circumscribe
significantly the scope of collective bargaining and to cripple a union's
ability to protect the job security of its membership. Closer examina-
tion of the opinion, however, suggests that First National Maintenance
may work little change in an employer's bargaining obligations in the
context of a partial plant closing. The impact of the case on the con-
duct of collective bargaining will turn ultimately on two factors: the
breadth with which the Court construes the duty to effects bargain, and
the time at which it concludes the duty to engage in such bargaining
attaches. The language of the opinion, the precedent, and the equities
involved all militate for a broad reading of the duty and to its attach-
ment prior to the decision's implementation.
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act requires an
employer to "bargain collectively" with the properly designated repre-
sentative of its employees.6 Section 8(d) of the Act defines the phrase
"bargain collectively" as the mutual obligation of employer and union
to meet and confer over "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment." 7 To ensure that the Act could be adapted to varied and
changing circumstances, Congress gave no further definition of the sub-
jects over which bargaining must occur. Rather, it left to the National
Labor Relations Board the task of determining, subject to limited judi-
cial review, which topics fall within the ambit of the duty.' The lan-
guage of section 8(d) is accordingly broad and malleable, and in
marking out its scope, the Board is to "appraise carefully the interests
of both" labor and management? in light of current "industrial
realities."10
The duty to bargain fits rather uncomfortably at times in a system
which presupposes the right of owners of capital to determine freely its
use and management. The purpose of the duty is to afford working
people the opportunity to speak with a collective voice concerning deci-
sions which will directly affect their working lives: the breadth of the
statutory language implies that an employer must bargain over any
matter which might have an impact on them. Consequently, the obli-
gation to bargain seems to severely limit the prerogatives traditionally
assumed to belong to management. Both the Board and the Court,
however, have sought to construe section 8(d) so as to effectuate its
5. See Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 63 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264 (1966).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
7. Id § 158(d).
8. Eg., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1979).
9. NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 357 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1958).
10. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300,326 (1965) (White, J., concurring). See
also Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979).
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underlying purpose while leaving intact basic entrepreneurial rights.
They have attempted to strike this balance chiefly through viewing the
language of section 8(d) as a limitation on the bargaining obligation.
In its opinion in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg Warner Corp. ," the
Court adopted the Board's distinction between mandatory and permis-
sive subjects of bargaining. Reading sections 8(d) and 8(a)(5) together,
the Court concluded, in agreement with the Board, that the Act com-
pels bargaining only as to "wages, hours, and terms and conditions of
employment," i.e., issues that settle an aspect of the employment rela-
tionship. '2 Bargaining over other subjects, the Court ruled, is strictly at
the election of the parties, who may not insist to impasse over them. 13
This holding has freed employers to take unilateral action on permis-
sive topics, and has insulated decisions concerning such matters from
the reach of union-generated economic pressure and bargaining
demands.
Basic entrepreneurial decisions have also been excluded from sec-
tion 8(d). In Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. Y. NLRB, t4 the Court
held that the subcontracting of work previously performed by unit
members is a mandatory subject because the loss of jobs, which is its
concomitant, affects "conditions of employment."' 5 Justice Stewart's
seminal concurrence, however, limited the majority's holding to its
facts. The Court, he stated, "most assuredly does not" hold that every
managerial decision which results in the loss of employment .is a
mandatory subject.' 6 Suggesting as examples the decision to invest in
labor-saving machinery and the decision to liquidate assets and to
withdraw from business, Justice Stewart stated that the Act imposed no
duty to bargain over matters "which lie at the core of entrepreneurial
control."' 7 Determinations concerning the "commitment of investment
capital and the basic scope of the enterprise," he continued, "are not
primarily about conditions of employment," and therefore fall without
the reach of the duty.' The concurrence's narrow reading of section
8(d) with its exclusion of basic management decisions has been adopted
in a number of Board and court decisions concerning the scope of an
11. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
12. Chemical Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971) (discussing the
distinction between mandatory and permissive topics).
13. The Court in Borg Warner accordingly affirmed the Board's conclusion that the em-
ployer had breached its duties under § 8(a)(5) by insisting that the collective bargaining agreement
with its employees contain a clause which would have required the union to hold a pre-strike vote
over whether to accept the company's last offer, and a recognition clause excluding the interna-
tional union, the certified bargaining agent, as a party to the contract.
14. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
15. Id at 209.




employer's bargaining duty,' 9 and formed the intellectual underpin-
ning for the majority's holding in First National Maintenance.
As this discussion demonstrates, the guidelines to determine the
scope of the bargaining duty are, described charitably, vague; not sur-
prisingly, the subject has been a fecund source for litigation. A major
problem, of course, is that often the closer a decision comes to being
capable of characterization as an exercise of entrepreneurial preroga-
tive, the greater is its impact on the terms and conditions of an individ-
ual's employment. Consequently, determining the line between
mandatory and permissive topics and, more particularly, distinguishing
between decisions which lie within and without the "core of enter-
preneurial control," can be, to use Melville's analogy, like trying to
identify the point at which orange turns to red. No issue so well dem-
onstrates the difficulty in striking a balance between the rights of work-
ers and entrepreneurs as that which involves the duty of an employer to
bargain over an economically motivated decision to terminate a por-
tion of its operations. Consistent with the complexity of the problem,
the law concerning the scope of the duty to discuss such a decision has
had a long, tangled, and confusing development, and itself grows out of
cases involving plant removals, subcontracting, and like operational
modifications, which raise legally indistinguishable issues concerning
the reach of the obligation.2 °
I
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DuTy-A CURSORY SKETCH
The cases that are generally regarded as the pivotal Board deci-
sions concerning the duty to bargain over operational changes are Town
& Country Manufacturing Co. 2t and Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.
19. See Infra text accompanying note 47.
20. While capable of being distinguished conceptually, plant relocations and partial termi-
nations raise virtually identical issues. Accordingly, the Board and the courts have treated the two
situations analogously with regard to the duty to bargain. In Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB,
582 F.2d 720, 724 n.10 (3d Cir. 1978), for example, the court observed:
A "partial closing" is a closing of one facility by an employer having at least two
plants. A variant on thfe situation of a partial closing is that of a plant relocation, in
which one of two or more facilities is shut down and then relocated. Both a partial
closing and a relocation decision should be distinguished, in the first instance, from a
complete closing of an entire business, which occurs when the employer goes utterly out
of business.
Circuits which had concluded that the Act requires decision bargaining over partial closings and
plant relocations as well as subcontracting have considered all three situations as analogous. Eg.,
ABC Trans-National Transp., Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 675, 680-81 (3d Cir. 1981); ILGWU v.
NLRB (McLoughlin Mfg. Corp.), 463 F.2d 907, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
21. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 49 L.R.LM. (BNA) 1918 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir.
1963).
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(Fibreboard II).2 In Town & Country, the company had unilaterally
subcontracted the trucking portion of its manufacturing operations and
discharged its drivers shortly after the latter had unionized. The Board
dismissed as pretextual the company's assertions that its decision was
economically motivated. 3 More significantly, however, it concluded
that the company had violated section 8(a)(5) by failing to negotiate
with its employees' representative before discontinuing its cartage oper-
ations. The elimination of unit jobs, stated the Board, even if moti-
vated by economic considerations, is a mandatory subject. "[P]rior
discussion with a duly designated bargaining representative," the
Board admonished, "is all that the Act contemplates. But it commands
no less."24
The Board in Town & Country specifically reversed its decision,
issued only the year before, in FibreboardI.25 In that case, the General
Counsel had contended that Fibreboard, by unilaterally subcontracting
the work performed by its maintenance employees, had breached its
statutory duty to bargain.26 The Board, noting that the company had
offered to discuss termination benefits with the union, disagreed.2 7 The
22. 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 51 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1101, enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
aj/'d, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
23. 136 N.L.R.B. at 1026, 49 L.RIR.M. (BNA) at 1920. The Board accordingly concluded
that anti-union animus had prompted the company's actions, in violation of § 8(a)(3) of the Act,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976). Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization."
24. 136 N.L.R.B. at 1027, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1920.
25. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558, 47 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1547 (1961).
26. General Counsel relied in part in Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 494,44 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1407 (1959), enforcedsmb non International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 310 v. NLRB, 280
F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1960). There, the Board concluded that the em-
ployer violated section 8(a)(5) by refusing to bargain over whether the "independent contractor
system of distribution" of the company's products should replace the use of employee owner sales-
men. 124 N.L.R.B. at 497-98, 44 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1409.
27. Member Fanning strongly dissented from the majority's conclusion. In addition to citing
Shamrock Dairy, he noted that the Board, in Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 18
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1370 (1946), enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947),
had specifically adopted the Trial Examiner's finding that the company's refusal to bargain about
its intention to subcontract work in the future violated its statutory obligations. Fanning further
maintained that, whatever the effect of prior cases, the Supreme Court's opinion in Railroad Te-
legraphers v. Chicago & N.Y. Ry. Co., 362 U.S. 330 (1960), was controlling. In Railroad Telegra-
phers, the Court, interpreting the analogous provisions of the Railway Labor Act, held that a
contractual provision proposed by the union, which would have required union consent before the
company abolished any positions held by its members, was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The Fibreboard I majority distinguished these three cases on the grounds that in each, there
remained in the preexisting unit persons in the company's employ represented by the union.
Thus, in each, they asserted, decisions the employer might make concerning subcontracting
(Timken, Shamrock Daiy) or partial closings (Radio Telegraphers) had or might have an impact
on the conditions of employment of those still employed in the suit. The majority stated that, in
the present case, "no employees remained in the unit to be represented by the Union, and thus
there could be no impact on the employment conditions" for those who remained. Accordingly,
1983] DISTINCTIONS WITHOUT DIFFERENCES
"broad proposition" that the statute compels an employer "to bargain
. . . about its decision to contract out" work, the Board exclaimed, was
contrary both to precedent and to the language of the Act.28 The chal-
lenged action, the Board concluded, constituted a valid exercise of
managerial prerogative which fell outside the reach of the bargaining
duty because it did not affect conditions of employment. Upon its re-
consideration of the case, the Board thoroughly recanted this position,
holding squarely that Fibreboard's failure to bargain "concerning its
decision to subcontract its maintenance work" constitued a violation of
section 8(a)(5).29
Despite the Board's protests that Town & Country and Fibreboard
II represented no innovation, these cases provoked great controversy 30
and claims on the part of commentators that they represented "a signif-
icant departure" from prior Board decisions.3 1 A review of the perti-
they concluded that the cases did not stand for "the proposition which our colleague urges--that a
union which will not represent any of the employer's employees is entitled to bargain about mat-
ters which will have an impact only when it ceases to be a representative." 130 N.L.R.B. at 1561,
47 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1549.
28. Id at 1560, 47 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1548.
29. 138 N.L.R.B. at 551, 51 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1101. The quick reversal of Fibreboard I
was due to a change in the Board's composition. Fberboard! was issued on March 27, 1961. 130
N.L.R.B. 1560,47 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1547. Four members participated in this decision. Members
Rodgers, Leedom, and Joseph Jenkins formed the majority, Record at 39, Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964), with Member Fanning, as noted, dissenting in part.
(Fanning concurred in the majority's conclusion that the company had not violated the notice
provisions of §8(d) of the Act.) Chairman McCulloch, whose appointment by President Kennedy
was confirmed by the Senate on March 2, 1961, 107 Cong. Rec. 3113 (1961), had been appointed
to succeed Member Jenkins, whose term had expired. Shortly thereafter, the union and the Gen-
eral Counsel filed motions for reconsideration, which were not acted on until September 13, 1962,
when the Board issued its Supplemental Decision in Fibrehoard II, 138 N.L.R.B. 550, 51
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1101. In the interim, the Board issued its Town & Country decision, in which
Chairman McCulloch and Members Brown and Fanning formed the majority. Petitioner's Brief
at 6 n.2, Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co. v. NLRB. Because he had been the Regional Director who
had signed the complaint against the company, Member Brown did not participate in the Board's
Supplemental Decision in Fibreboard. Memorandum for NLRB at 5 n.3, Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Co. v. NLRB.
For a general discussion of the Board's policy prior to the Kennedy appointments, see Note,
The NLAB Under the Republican Administralom Recent Trends and Their Political Implications,
55 COLUM. L. REv. 852 (1955).
30. See, eg., Address by Theophil C. Kammholz, General Meeting of the American Iron
and Steel Institute (May 28, 1964), in 56 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 137 (1964); Address by Frederick R.
Livingston, Midwest Seminar on NLRB Policy Changes, in 52 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 84 (1963);
O'Connell, The Implications of Decison Bargaining, 16 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAoR 99 (1961). Stat-
ing that management had been precluded from making "its own decision on the location of facili-
ties, on the future prospects of the business," and that "it may no longer decide for itself whether it
will stay in business or whether it will go out of business," Congressman Landrum introduced a
bill to transfer jurisdiction over unfair labor practice cases from the NLRB to the federal district
courts. 109 Cong. Rec. 16042 (1963). Landrum further stated with reference to.FbreboardfI that
"this eye opening NLRB doctrine about management prerogatives is but the latest in a long line of
extra-statutory powers this Board had arrogated to itself." Id
31. Note, Duty to Bargain: Subcontracting Relocation and Partial Termination, 55 GEO. L.J.
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nent cases, however, demonstrates that the Board's assertions were
substantially correct. For, while conflicting precedent existed,32 the
Board in its pre-Town & Country decisions had generally concluded
that the abolition of unit positions constituted a matter which arose
under the statutory phrase "terms and conditions of employment."
33
Accordingly, these early cases ordinarily required an employer to con-
fer with the representative of its employees before executing any
879, 888 (1967). See also Goetz, The Duty to Bargain About Changes in Operations, 1964 DuKE
L.J. I; Address by Stuart Rothman, Labor Law Section of the Wisconsin Bar Ass'n (Feb. 15,
1964), in 52 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 57, 64 (1963) ("[w]hat is novel in the Town and Country case is the
Board's statement that the employer's decision, I repeat, decision, to subcontract unit work is a
mandatory subject of bargaining, requiring notice to and discussion with the collective bargaining
representative"). At the time he made this address, Rothman was the Board's General Counsel.
But see Address by Arnold Ordman, Labor Law Section of the Georgia Bar Ass'n (Mar. 15, 1963),
in 52 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 86 (1963) (Fibreboardll holding "was not new, either as a matter of legal
precedent or as a matter of practical and established collective bargaining history"). Ordman was
chief counsel to Chairman McCulloch at the time he delivered his address and succeeded Roth-
man as the Board's General Counsel in May 1963.
For further discussion of the duty to bargain about operational changes, see Murphy, Plant
Relocation and the Collective-Bargaining Obligation, 59 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1980); Schwarz, Plant Relo-
cation or Partial Termination-The Duty to Decision-Bargain, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 81 (1970);
Comment, Employer's Duty to Bargain About Subcontracting and Other "Management" Decisions,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 294 (1964).
32. E.g., Walter Holm & Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1169,25 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1270 (1949); Mahoning
Mining Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 792, 16 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 110 (1945).
33. E.g., Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 998, 41 L.R.M. (BNA) 1216, supplemented,
124 N.L.R.B. 494, 44 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1407 (1959), enforced sub nom. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, Local 310 v. NLRB, 280 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 892 (1960); Brown
Truck & Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1580 (1953); California Portland
Cement Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1436, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1220 (1952), supplemented, 103 N.L.R.B.
1375,31 L.R.R.M. 1630 (1953), Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 18 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1370 (1946), enforcement denied on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1947); Brown-McLaren
Mfg. Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 984, 9 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 950 (1941). All of these cases involved economi-
cally motivated operational changes. The Board, however, had also long construed the Act to
impose similar bargaining obligations in which operational changes were shown to have been
discriminatorily rather than economically motivated. In such cases, the Board has normally found
that the employer's failure to consult with the union prior to implementing the change constituted
a separate violation of § 8(a)(5). See, eg., Brown Dunkin Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 1379, 45 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1256 (1959), enforced, 287 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1961) (subcontracting unit work without prior
notification and bargaining with the union violates § 8(a)(5)); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.,
101 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1215, 1245, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1195, 1196-97 (1945), enforcement denied, 211
F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954) (company's failure to consult with the union and negotiate prior to sub-
contracting unit work a separate violation of§ 8(a)(5)); Stilley Plywood Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 932, 969,
28 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1120 (1951), enforced as modofed, 199 F.2d 319 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 933 (1953) (subcontracting of certain logging operations without prior notice to the union
violated § 8(a)(5)); Eva Ray Dress Mfg. Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 361, 382, 25 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1328, 1330
(1950), enforcedper curiam, 191 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1951) (partial termination); Rome Prods. Co.,
77 N.L.R.B. 1217, 22 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1138 (1948) (plant removal); Pepsi Cola Bottling Co.
(Montgomery), 72 N.L.R.B. 601, 19 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1208 (1947) (violation where the company
failed to notify or consult the union concerning shutdown). Not surprisingly, in cases involving
discriminatory motivation such as Brown Dunkin, the Board had frequently relied on cases arising
in the context of economically motivated changes, such as Shamrock Dairy, to find a violation of
the duty to bargain.
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change in its operations which would have adversely affected unit
members' opportunities for continued employment. As with any
mandatory subject, the key element in these cases was the requirement
that notice and an opportunity to bargain precede the implementation
of the change. Thus, for example, in its 1941 decision in Gerity filta-
ker Co. ," the Board found that the employer's unilateral interplant
relocation of bargaining unit work, which resulted in the lay-off of a
substantial number of unit employees, constituted a violation of section
8(a)(5).35 The Board stated that the company's actions worked "such a
drastic and crucial change" in its employment conditions that "the re-
fusal to bargain inherent in such removal, when presented as an accom-
plished fact, could not be cured by the bargaining that subsequently
occurred" concerning the employment of some of the affected employ-
ees at the plant to which the work had been transferred.
36
Interestingly, it was not untile Fibreboard I that the Board began
to conceptualize the statutory requirement to confer over operational
changes as a dichotomous obligation composed of separate and distinct
duties to decision- and effects-bargain. Accordingly, the pre-
Fibreboard cases typically discuss the employer's obligations in general
terms, such as the duty to bargain over whether the change "should be
adopted,"' 3 or "regarding the subcontracting of work."' 33 Significantly,
in keeping with the Act's policy of free collective bargaining,39 the
cases do not detail the subjects such discussions were expected to en-
compass. The cases' language makes clear, however, that these confer-
ences were to be catholic in scope. Among the issues which were
assumed to be a natural part of such bargaining was whether some
modification, concession, or suggestion of alternative approach would
obviate the need or desire to effect the planned change. Bargaining was
also to encompass discussion of methods of ameliorating the impact of
the planned change on employees, such as opportunities for transfer,
retraining, severance pay, and benefit continuation.40 All of these top-
34. 33 N.L.B. 393, 8 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 275, enforced as modofedper curiam, 137 F.2d 198
(6th Cir. 1942).
35. Id at 406-07, 8 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 278-79.
36. Id at 407, 8 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 279.
37. Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. at 496, 44 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 1409.
38. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. at 504, 188 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1372.
39. See, eg., NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
40. Eg., Stilley Plywood Co., in which the Board adopted the following statement of its
Administrative Law Judge:
It is settled law that an employer is obligated to notify the collective bargaining represen-
tative of his employees of any ... contemplated changes in the wages or working condi-
tions of his employees before putting the changes into effect, in order to afford the
bargaining representative an opportunity to discuss with the employer such questions,
e.g., as whether or not the changes (if adverse to the employees) can be avoided, the
manner in which the changes should be effected, and the principles to govern a return, if
any, to the former conditions of employment.
19831
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ics, however, were seen as interrelated parts of "terms and conditions";
hence, no attempt was made to distinguish among them.
In light of the precedent, the striking thing about Fibreboard I is
the Board's preoccupation with the word "decision" and the images its
use seemingly evoked. The Board apparently feared that by requiring
Fibreboard to discuss alternatives to its subcontracting plan, i.e., to de-
cision-bargain, a novel duty would be imposed on the company
through which the union would gain an equal voice in determinations
concerning the use and management of the employer's economic re-
sources. The delineation between decision- and effects-bargaining was
made in response to this apprehension. Through this delineation the
Board attempted to separate the prerogatives of entrepreneurs and the
rights statutorily guaranteed to workers into isolated spheres, thereby
resolving the basic tension created by the bargaining obligation. The
distinction recognizes the stake that workers have in decisions like sub-
contracting. It acts, however, to limit the scope of their influence as
closely as possible to wage-related topics, such as severance pay and
benefit continuation. It is such topics, where employee rights are most
clearly established, that head-on conflicts with interests viewed as in-
trinsic and exclusive to management prerogatives are least likely to
arise.
The Board's decisions in Town & Country and Fibreboard II, and
the Supreme Court's affirmance of the latter, clearly resolved the scope
of the employer's duty to bargain about subcontracting. These cases
also firmly cemented the conceptualization of the obligation as com-
posed of two analytically distinct parts. Since that time, the Board and
the courts have examined an employer's statutory obligations to discuss
other types of operational changes, such as plant relocations and partial
closings, in terms of its duty to decision-bargain and to effects-bargain.
In Ozark Trailers, Inc. ,4 the Board in its first post-Fibreboard con-
sideration of the issue, framed aperse rule concerning the duty to bar-
gain about both the decision and the effects of an employer's
economically motivated discontinuance of a portion of its operations.
It concluded, in reliance on the Court's Fibreboard opinion, that be-
cause the implementation of such decisions necessarily results in em-
ployment terminations, they affect "terms and conditions" and
therefore constitute a mandatory subject.42 Although the Board has
94 N.L.R.B. at 969.
41. 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 63 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264 (1966).
42. Id at 565, 63 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1267. In stating its conclusion, the Board acknowl-
edged that two circuits had recently held, largely in reliance on Justice Stewart's Fibreboard con-
currence, that an employer's decision to terminate a phase of operations was not a mandatory
subject of bargaining. The Board noted that the Eighth Circuit had held in NLRB v. Adams
Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966), that the dairy's deci-
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carved out some exceptions to Ozark's application, 3 it has generally,
albeit somewhat erratically, followed Ozark in cases involving partial
plant closings and relocations."
The courts, in contrast, have commonly,45 though not univer-
sion to change its distribution system by substituting independent contractors for its employee
drivers was not a mandatory subject because it involved a "basic operational change" and a "par-
tial liquidation and a recoup of capital investment." The Third Circuit had similarly held in
NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965), that the company's determi-
nation to close one of its two plants involved a "management decision to recommit and reinvest
funds in the business" and was a "major change in the economic direction of the Company"
which impinged only indirectly on employment security and therefore fell outside the scope of the
duty. Id. at 196. In contrast, the Board's focus in cases involving economically motivated deci-
sions to subcontract or partially terminate a business would not be on the "commitment of capi-
tal" or the degree to which the decision would change the nature of the employer's business, but
on the impact such a decision would have on the bargaining unit.
43. Since handing down that decision, the Board has created three categories of exceptions
to Ozark. The first of these might be labelled a "futility" exception. In such cases, the Board
concludes that factors outside the parties' direct control make bargaining over the decision useless.
For example, in Brooks-Scanlon, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 476, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1606,petition to
review denied, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2176 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the Board declined to find a violation
where the employer made a unilateral decision to close its sawmill department because of a lack of
trees sufficient to support its operation.
A second line of cases in which the Board finds no duty to decision-bargain concerns situa-
tions in which an employer, by its partial closing, entirely withdraws itself from a discrete line of
business. Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479, 79 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1396 (1972), enforced, 83
L.R.R.M. 2044 (7th Cir. 1973), is an example. Here, the employer maintained both a tool design
and drafting service and a manufacturing operation. For economic reasons, it closed the latter.
The Board found that § 8(a)(5) did not require bargaining "about its decision to close out its
manufacturing operation because this would significantly abridge respondent's freedom to man-
age its own affairs." Id at 480, 79 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1400.
A third line of exceptions, closely related to the second, finds no duty to bargain about capital
investment decisions that alter the fundamental nature and direction of the enterprise. The lead-
ing case in this category is General Motors Corp., GMC Truck & Coach Div., 191 N.L.R.B. 951,
77 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1537 (197 1), enforcedsub mo. UAW, Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). Here the Board concluded that GM had no duty to bargain over its decision to sell a
truck center to a dealer who would operate it under the terms of a franchise agreement. The
Board stated that the Act does not require bargaining over "decisions such as this, in which a
significant investment or withdrawal of capital will affect the scope and ultimate direction of an
enterprise." These matters, the Board concluded, "lie at the very core of entrepreneurial control."
191 N.L.R.B. at 952, 77 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1539. Ironically, the second and third categories of
exceptions find their roots in Justice Stewart's Fibreboard concurrence, which states an approach
the Board specifically declined to follow in its Ozark decision.
44. Compare, eg., National Car Rental System, Inc., 252 N.L.ILB. 159, 161, 105 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1263, 1266 (1980) (no duty to bargain over decision to partially terminate operations at one
of employer's facilities, because decision was "essentially financial and managerial in nature" and
affected "the scope and ultimate direction" of the enterprise; relying on General Motors Corp.,
GMC Truck & Coach Div.) with National Family Opinion, Inc., 246 N.LR.B. 521, 102 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1641 (1979) (duty to bargain about decision to close portion of operations for union activi-
ties and thus discriminatory).
45. E.g., NLRB v. International Harvester Co., 618 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. North
Carolina Coastal Motor Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1976); Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB,
533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Acme Indus. Prods., Inc., 439 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Thompson Transp. Co., 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Transmarine Naviga-
tion Corp., 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191
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sally,' confined the duty to decision-bargain strictly to subcontracting.
The rationale of the opinions so restricting the duty is largely that of
Justice Stewart's Fibreboard concurrence, which stated that managerial
decisions regarding the "commitment of investment capital" or the
"basic scope of the enterprise" impinge only indirectly on conditions of
employment and therefore do not fall within the reach of the language
of section 8(d). 7 In their subsequent considerations, the lower courts
have generally concluded that partial closing and relocation decisions
involve determinations concerning investment and enterprise scope
and thus do not constitute mandatory subjects. Like the Board, how-
ever, they have uniformly required employers to bargain over effects.
The First National Maintenance decision settles the uncertainties
generated by the splits between and within the Board and the courts
concerning the scope of an employer's bargaining duties in the context
of a partial closing. The Court's opinion is the progeny of Justice Stew-
art's Fibreboard concurrence, and adopts its restrictive reading of sec-
tion 8(d). Like the concurrence, the First National Maintenance
opinion strongly parallels the Board's first Fibreboard decision in at-
tempting to demarcate a bright line between the rights of employees
and entrepreneurs. It also echoes the concern stated by the Board in
Fibreboard I that by compelling an employer to bargain over such a
decision, the union would thereby "become an equal partner in the
running of the business enterprise in which the union's members are
employed. '4 Further, the opinion reflects the Court's belief that deci-
sion bargaining is unlikely to "augment" the "flow of information and
suggestions"4 9 concerning alternatives to the closing, and thus that its
imposition would achieve little that cannot be gained through effects
bargaining. Nevertheless, like Fibreboard1, the opinion recognizes the
interest employees have in such decisions. Accordingly, it indicates
that the Act requires the union to be given a "significant opportunity to
bargain" about effects and that this bargaining must occur "in a mean-
(3d Cir. 1965). But see NLRB v. Production Molded Plastics, Inc., 644 F.2d 451 (6th Cir. 1979)
(holding that employer had duty to bargain over decision to close and effects; no discussion of
Acme).
46. Eg., NLRB v. W.R. Grace & Co., 571 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1978); ILGWU v. NLRB
(McLoughlin Mfg. Corp.), 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 361
F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966). But.ee UAW, Local 864 v. NLRB, 470 F.2d
422 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Some circuits have recently shown more willingness to impose a duty to
bargain about partial closing decisions. See, e.g., NLRB v. First Natl Maintenance Corp., 627
F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rey'd, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 582
F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978) (clarifying RoyalPlating by formulating rebuttable presumption test con-
cerning decision bargaining). See generally Comment, Duty to Bargain About Termination of Op.
erations: Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 92 HA.v. L. Rnv. 768 (1979).
47. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
48. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. at 676.
49. Id at 681.
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ingful manner and at a meaningful time."" ° In order to better under-
stand the contours of the line the Court has established between the
rights of entrepreneurs and employees, and the probable impact of its
holding on the collective bargaining process, it is necessary to deter-
mine the definitions of and the differences between decision and effects
bargaining.
II
DECISION AND EFFECTS BARGAINING--CONTENTS OF THE
DUTIES
A. Purpose and Scope
The obligation to decision-bargain simply requires an employer to
notify its employees' representative that an operational change which
will adversely affect employee tenure is planned,51 and to discuss and
consider in good faith any suggestions the union might offer concerning
alternative courses.52 As discussed above, the duty recognizes the inter-
ests that employees have in such alterations. It is designed to accom-
modate those interests by affording the union "an opportunity to
engage in a full and frank discussion"53 concerning the employer's
plan. The chief purpose of the obligation is to allow employees the
chance to protect their livelihoods by guaranteeing their collective rep-
resentative an occasion to influence the employer's final decision to im-
plement the change.54 Consequently, the cases make clear that all
factors relevant to the decision are subject to bargaining. The results of
50. Id at 681-82.
51. There is no duty to bargain over operational changes which have no impact on employee
tenure or working conditions. See, eg., Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 186 N.L.R.B. 1050, 75
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1551, 1552, enforced in perinenipart sub nom. Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store
Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (no duty to bargain over elimination of
certain machinery where decision did not significantly affect employee tenure); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. (Mansfield Plant), 150 N.L.R.B. 1574, 1576,58 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1257, 1258 (1965) (no
duty to bargain about subcontracting that did not eliminate unit jobs or significantly affect unit
interests).
52. Eg., Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 568, 63 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1264, 1269 (1966).
The Board recently explained the purpose of decision bargaining:
The underlying rationale for requiring bargaining over such matters is that the union-
on behalf of and as representative of the employees--should be accorded an opportunity
to engage in a full and frank discussion regarding such decisions. In this way parties are
presented with an opportunity to explore possible alternatives to accommodate their re-
spective interests and thereby resolve whatever issue confronts them in a mutually ac-
ceptable way.
Brockway Motor Trucks, 230 N.L.R.B. 1002, 1003, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1462, 1463 (1977), enforce-
ment denied and remanded, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), supplemented, 251 N.L.R.B. 29, 104
L.R.RM. (BNA) 1515 (1980), conrent decree denying enforcement approved, 656 F.2d 32 (3d Cir.
1981).
53. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. at 568, 63 L.R.RM. (BNA) at 1268.
54. E.g., Brockway Motor Trucks, 230 N.L.R.B. at 1003,95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1463; Ozark
Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. at 568, 63 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1268.
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these discussions, the Board has noted, "are not germane" to the statu-
tory obligation which only requires that the parties "meet and confer in
good faith.""5 The Act's purpose, and the Board's sole function, it has
declared, is to assure that the opportunity for such discussion exists.56
Because the duty to decision-bargain is a more limited one than
the term itself suggests, it is important to note the limits within which
the Board has held it to operate. The duty clearly does not compre-
hend the inclusion of union representatives in management delibera-
tions concerning operational or investment strategy, nor does it give
employees an equal voice in corporate decision-making. Rather, it
only requires that, upon deciding to make an operational change, the
employer notify the union of the plan and entertain in good faith any
alternatives the union may formulate before implementing the modifi-
cation.57 The term "decision bargaining" then is a misleading one
since it intimates that a union has rights far broader than those the
Board's interpretation of the Act actually recognizes. The inaccurate
image of direct employee participation in management's decision-mak-
ing process, which the term's use apparently evokes, probably accounts
for much of the reluctance on the part of courts to impose that duty. At
base, decision bargaining is no more than an industrial version of due
process.
The duty to effects-bargain, in contrast, treats the employer's deci-
sion as immutable and sacrosanct. Thus, its focus is not on ways that
the change might be avoided, but solely on the terms under which it
will be effectuated. The duty's purpose has accordingly been described
as intended to provide the union with "an opportunity to bargain over
the rights of employees whose employment status will be altered by the
55. Brockway Motor Trucks, 230 N.L.R.B. at 1003, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1463.
56. Id at 1003, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1463.
57. This point was made with great clarity in Lange Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 558, 91 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1311 (1976). There, the Board adopted the decision of the Administrative Law Judge who
observed:
f[]n no case has the Board held that an employer must defer making a decision concern-
ing terms and conditions of eniployment until it has first conferred with [the] representa-
tive of its employees. The requirement is that, after reaching the decision, the employer
must then notify the representative and afford the opportunity to discuss that decision
and to consider alternative proposals. Thus, in Ozark Trailers (citation omitted], the
Board made clear that the illegality lay not in the fact that the employer had first made
the decision before consulting with its employees' representative. The illegality lay in the
implementation of that decision prior to affording the representative an opportunity to
advance and discuss [an] alternative course of action. [citation omitted]
Id at 563. See also Love's Barbecue Restaurant No. 62, 245 N.L.R.B. 78, 112-13, 102 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1546, 1548 (1979), enforced in part and remanded in part, 640 F.2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1981);
Lemon Tree, 231 N.L.R.B. 1168, 1176 n.35, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1204, 1204 (1976), enforced sub
nomn NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980) (both citing the above-quoted
language from Lange).
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managerial decision,"58 and as designed "to moderate the closing's im-
pact on the work force."59 Not surprisingly then, the cases frequently
indicate, as did the Third Circuit's opinion in NLRB v. Royal Plating
and Polishing Co. ,60 that "issues such as severance pay, seniority and
pensions, among others, are necessarily of particular relevance and im-
portance" as topics over which effects bargaining should occur.61
In accordance with the Act's scheme of free collective bargain-
ing,62 however, the cases have not limited the scope of effects bargain-
ing to any set list of subjects. Rather, they indicate that its scope is very
broad and encompasses "any and all"63 effects flowing from the deci-
sion's implementation. The most crucial of these are opportunities for
continued employment at the employer's other facilities. As the Sec-
ond Circuit observed in Cooper Thermometer Co. v. NLRB," which
involved a plant relocation:
The Board may reasonably interpret Section 8(a)(5), as explicated in
Section 8(d) as requiring an employer.., not merely to give reason-
able notice to a recognized union and to negotiate the terms of the shut-
down... but also to discuss with it the basis on which employees may
transfer and in that connection, to give information as to the jobs in the
new plant essential to the intelligent formulation of the union's re-
quests. The most important interest of workers is in working; the
Board may reasonably consider that an employer does not fiulfill his
obligations under Section 8(a)(5) if he refuses even to discuss with the
employees' representatives on what basis they may continue to be
employed.6s
While, as noted, the substance of decision and effects bargaining is
unstructured, the obligation to conduct negotiations in good faith re-
quires an employer to fully disclose to the union those of its plans and
intentions which will directly affect employees' terms and conditions."
Thus, for example, the Board has consistently found that an employer
58. Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. at 563,63 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1266 (quoting NLRB v.
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1965)).
59. Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d at 736.
60. 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
61. Id at 196.
62. See supra note 39.
63. Eg., Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1086 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting
NLRB v. Acme Indus. Prods., 439 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1971)).
64. 376 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1967), enforcing inpertinentpart 160 N.L.R.B. 1902,63 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1219 (1966).
65. 376 F.2d at 688. See also NLRB v. National Car Rental System, Inc., 672 F.2d 1182,
1188 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[o]ne of the effects over which there was a duty to bargain was whether
National would transfer any of Newark's employees" to its new facility in Edison, New Jersey);
NLRB v. North Carolina Motor Lines, Inc., 542 F.2d 637, 638 (4th Cir. 1976) (partial closing
created duty to discuss opportunities for continued employment at employer's other facilities).
66. E.g., Sun Maid Growers, 239 N.L.R.B. 346, 353, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1668 (1978), en-
forced, 618 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1980).
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who bargains with its employees' representatives over the terms of a
new agreement, but fails to inform the union that it is contemplating
the shutdown of the facility for which bargaining is being conducted,
violates the Act.67 The Board and the courts have similarly found a
violation where an employer notified the union that it planned to close
one of its facilities, but neglected to reveal that it intended to continue
the operations performed there at another of its plants.68
B. When the Duty to Bargain Attaches
Timing lies at the core of both decision and effects bhrgaining. As
the Court instructed in NLRB v. Katz, 69 "unilateral action by an em-
ployer [concerning a mandatory subject] without prior discussion with
the union," constitutes a refusal to bargain. 0 Accordingly, the cases
are unanimous in concluding that notice and an opportunity for bar-
gaining over the decision and effects must precede the implementation
of an operational change. They constantly remind, with a phrase that
has developed into a term of art in this area, that bargaining is mean-
ingless if the union is faced with afair aecompli?'
To properly discharge its obligation to decision-bargain, it is in-
cumbent on an employer to "give the [u]nion advance notice of its in-
tention to close and provide the [ulnion with a fair opportunity to
bargain. '7 12 What constitutes a fair opportunity obviously varies with
the context of each case. 3 In general, the cases indicate that in order to
make decision bargaining meaningful, the union must be given "ample
and sufficient time to prepare an effective proposal"'74 in response to the
67. E.g., Lange Co., 222 N.L.R.B. at 563, 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1311.
68. Eg., ILGWU v. NLRB (McLoughlin Mfg. Corp.), 463 F.2d 907, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Republic Engraving & Designing Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1155, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNa) 1306, 1306
(1978).
69. 369 U.S. 736 (1962).
70. Id at 747.
71. Eg., P.B. Mutrie Motor Transp., Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1325, 1329 (1976). See also ILGWU
v. NLRB, 463 F.2d at 919 (quoting Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1030 (1962),
enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963)) ("no genuine bargaining. can be conducted where the
decision has already been made and implemented").
72. Lemon Tree, 231 N.L.R.B. at 1176. See also Rapid Air Expediting Co., 220 N.L.R.B.
931, 932 (1975) ("prior notice and a meaningful opportunity to bargain").
73. In Shell Oil Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 305,57 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1279 (1964), a case discussing an
employer's duty to bargain over a decision to subcontract work, the Board stated that in applying
the principles of Fibreboard II and Town & Country,
we are mindful that the permissibility of unilateral subcontracting will be determined by
a consideration of the setting of each case. Thus, the amount of time and discussion
required to satisfy the statutory obligation "to meet at reasonable times and confer in
good faith" may vary with the character of the subcontracting, the impact on employees,
and the exigencies of the particular business situation involved.
Id at 307, 57 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1280.
74. See Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn (Bishop Ford Central Catholic High School),
236 N.L.R.B. 1, 24, 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1359 (1978), supplemented, 243 N.L.R.B. 49, 101
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company's plans. Thus, for example, in Royal Typewriter Co. ,75 the
Board found that the company had not bargained in good faith when it
gave the union eight days notice of its decision to close one of its
plants.76 The Board observed that the plan had been under considera-
tion for several months during which the company had, inter alia, re-
fused to supply the union with financial information concerning the
termination decision.77 In contrast, the Board concluded in The Empo-
rium7 8 that three weeks prior notice was sufficient, particularly in light
of the fact that during this period, the union formulated no alternative
proposals nor sought additional time to study the situation.79 Not sur-
prisingly, in order to keep the process from becoming an empty ritual,
the cases also require that decision bargaining occur before the em-
ployer is irreversibly committed to effectuating the relocation or partial
termination. For example, in National Family Opinion,80 the Board
adopted that portion of the Administrative Law Judge's decision which
indicated that the company's duty to bargain over its decision to termi-
nate one of its departments arose before the plan was "finalized."''
As noted, the Board and the courts have also consistently held that
an employer must offer to bargain over the effects of a contemplated
operational modification prior to implementation.8 2 Like decision bar-
gaining, the amount of advance notice an employer is required to pro-
vide varies with the facts of each case.8 3 In general, the cases indicate
that notice must be delivered sufficiently in advance "to give the union
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1436 (1979), enforcement denied, 623 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 996 (1981).
75. 209 N.L.R.B. 1006,85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1501 (1974), enforced as modfed, 533 F.2d 1030
(8th Cir. 1976).
76. Id at 1013, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1510. In enforcing the Board's order, the Court,
citing ,4damr Dairy, declined to adopt the Board's view that the employer had the duty to bargain
over partial closing decisions. Since the Board had not ordered any remedial relief with regard to
this finding, the court found it "unnecessary to discuss this finding" further. 553 F.2d at 1039.
77. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
78. 221 N.L.R.B. 1211, 91 L.R.RM. (BNA) 1079 (1975).
79. Id at 1214.
80. 246 N.L.R.B. 521, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1641 (1979).
81. Id at 530. Similarly, in P.B. Mutrie Motor Transp., Inc., the Board adopted the decision
of its Administrative Law Judge which stated, in regard to the company's failure to bargain about
either the decision or the effects of its partial closing, that "it would have aided the bargaining
process if the issues could have been discussed before Respondent's decision had hardened into an
irrevocable position." 226 N.L.R.B. at 1330.
82. Eg , Soule Glass & Glazing Corp., 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981) and cases cited id at
1085-86:
In a number of cases involving business changes such as the termination of a particular
product line or the closing of one of several plants, courts have held that the employer is
required to give the union notice and the opportunity to bargain with respect to the
effects of the decision on unit employees before implementing the change.
Id at 1085.
83. Thus, for example, the D.C. Circuit held on the facts in UAW v. NLRB, 470 F.2d 422
(D.C. Cir. 1972), that one day's notice of the sale of the company's facility was sufficient. The
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a meaningful chance to offer counter-proposals and counter-argu-
ments,"8 4 or, as the Board sometimes phrases it, at a time when "a
measure of balanced bargaining power" exists.8 5 In contradistinction
to the duty to decision-bargain, however, it appears that effects bar-
gaining may occur after an employer is committed to the execution of
its decision, but, of course, prior to its actual implementation. 6
The cases make plain that the employer's notice of intent to make
an operational change must be clear and specific.8 7  The obligation is
not met where the employer merely makes a "limited reference" to the
possibility of a closing. 8 Further, the employer is not excused from
bargaining "merely because a union, after acquiring independent
knowledge of a contemplated change in operation, neglects" to demand
it. 9 Once such notice is given, however, the burden is on the union to
demand bargaining:9" the employer is not obligated "to seek out the
bargaining representative."9' A failure on the part of the union to re-
quest bargaining after receipt of such notice is considered to be a
waiver of its bargaining rights.92
court took special note of company efforts to find positions for displaced employees at its other
facilities.
84. NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 538 F.2d 1152, 1162 (5th Cir. 1976), quoted in W.R. Grace
& Co., 571 F.2d 279,282 (5th Cir. 1978). Similar formulations can be found in a number ofcases.
In ILGWU v. NLRB (McLoughlin Mfg. Co.), the D.C. Circuit stated that "[n]otice, to be effec-
tive, must be given sufficiently in advance of actual implementation of a decision to allow reason-
able scope for bargaining. 463 F.2d at 919. Similarly, in Borg-Warner Corp., 245 N.L.R.B. 513,
102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1452 (1979), enforced, 663 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1981), cer. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2903 (1982), the Board concluded that the company bargained in bad faith by deciding to relocate
parts of its operations two months before informing the union of its decision, and only ten days
before the decision was implemented. The Board adopted the decision of its Administrative Law
Judge which stated that such notice
hardly afforded the Union sufficient time to become fully advised of the subject matter,
confer with all interested individuals involved, to formulate plans and proposals for op-
tions or alternatives to deal with the problem, present the Company with such proposals,
and attempt to negotiate respecting all these matters prior to the date of the effectuation
of the plan.
245 N.L.R.B. at 518. See aro Walter Pape, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 719,720, 84 LR.R.M. (BNA) 1055,
1056 (1973) (when decision is "under consideration and [is] imminent").
85. E.g., Van's Packing Plant, 211 N.L.R.B. 692, 692, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1581, 1583 (1974).
86. See, eg., NLRB v. National Car Rental System, Inc., 672 F.2d at 1188. Admittedly, this
distinction is a fine one at best. In reality, there may be no way to distinguish the timing.
87. See, eg., id; ILGWU v. NLRB (McLoughlin Mfg. Co.), 463 F.2d at 918; NLRB v.
Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d at 194-95; NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170,
176 (2d Cir. 1961).
88. Stagg Zipper Corp., 222 N.L.R.B. 1249, 1249, 91 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1392, 1392 (1976).
89. Van's Packing Plant, 211 N.L.R.B. at 698. See also ILGWU v. NLRB (McLoughlin
Mfg. Co.), 463 F.2d at 918.
90. E.g., NLRB v. Spun-Jee Corp., 385 F.2d 379, 383-84 (2d Cir. 1967); Lemon Tree, 231
N.L.R.B. at 1176, 96 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1204.
91. NLRB v. National Car Rental System, Inc., 672 F.2d at 1188.
92. Eg., ILGWU v. NLRB (McLoughlin Mfg. Co.), 463 F.2d at 918; Industrial Feeding &
Catering, 216 N.L.R.B. 1098, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1559 (1975).
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C. The Union's Right to Information
The purpose of both decision and effects bargaining would be ren-
dered meaningless were the employees' representative required to bar-
gain without access to information in the employer's control concerning
the issues involved. Accordingly, another aspect of the duty to bargain
in good faith imposed by section 8(a)(5) includes the employer's duty to
supply its employees' representative with information. A twofold test
for triggering this obligation has been developed: under it, a union is
entitled to receive any information which is relevant or directly related
to its role as bargaining agent and which is reasonably necessary to
execute this function.93 "Wage and related information pertaining to
employees in the unit" is presumptively relevant. 94 Other types of in-
formation to which a union has a clear right include sickness records,
injury reports, insurance and workers' compensation records, pension
information, and the like.95
In the context of bargaining over partial terminations for assert-
edly economic reasons, access to financial information is obviously rel-
evant. The cases indicate that an employer which claims that it cannot
afford to operate a plant,96 or that it must close a plant in order to stay
competitive,97 has the duty to substantiate those claims by supplying
93. Eg., Ellsworth Sheet Metals, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1506, 1509, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1590
(1976), enforcedmein., 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979); Whitin Machine Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537,
1538, 34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1251, 1252 (1954), enforced, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 905 (1955). For a general discussion of the duty to supply information, see Soule Glass &
Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 1092-95 (1st Cir. 1981).
94. Cowles Communications, Inc., 172 N.L.R.B. 1909, 69 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1100 (1968).
95. See North Am. Soccer League, 245 N.L.R.B. 1301, 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1594 (1979)
and cases cited therein.
96. Cases in which the employer asserts that it cannot meet a particular union demand be-
cause of financial inability are controlled by NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). In
Truitt, the company claimed that it was financially unable to grant the union's request for a wage
increase. The union requested substantiation of that claim, including "full and complete informa-
tion with respect to (the company's] financial standing and profits." Id at 150. The Court, up-
holding the Board's determination, concluded that the employer's refusal to document its claim
violated § 8(a)(5). The Court found the company's inability to pay increased wages "highly rele-
vant" to their negotiations, and stated.
Good faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either bargainer should
be honest claims. This is true about an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages. If
such an argument is important enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is
important enough to require some sort of proof as to its accuracy.
Id at 152-53.
97. Situations in which an employer claims that general "economic" factors compel his posi-
tion have been treated similarly to "poverty" pleas under the Truitt doctrine. E.. Cincinnati
Cordage & Paper Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 72, 52 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1277 (1963). In Cincinnati Cordage,
the employer informed the union that it could not meet its wage demands and "stay competitive."
In defending against unfair labor practice charges, the company claimed that it was not pleading
"poverty" and should not be subject to the Truitt rule. The Board disagreed and ordered the
company to furnish the union with statistical and other information to substantiate its inability to
pay the requested wage increases. See also NLRB v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 497 F.2d 747
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the union with documentation.
Both the Board and the courts have applied a liberal standard of
relevancy analogous to that of civil discovery, in construing a union's
right to information."' An employer must supply information probably
relevant to any permissible union demand unless it would be extremely
burdensome to do so. 9 Moreover, the information obtained to make
initial union demands may lead to the acquisition of further informa-
tion. The liberal standard of relevancy and the incremental availability
of information as negotiations progress will probably allow a union
bargaining only over the effects of partial termination to obtain nearly
as much financial data as it would were it bargaining over the decision
to terminate as well.
III
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Although the Fourth Circuit stated confidently in NLRB v. North
Carolina Coastal Motor Lines"ee that the distinction between decision
and effects bargaining "is a real one," '' the First Circuit may have
come much closer to the truth in its opinion in NLRB v. Soule Glass and
Glazing Co. 102 when it observed that it is a "distinction which at times
is difficult to draw."'10 3 Indeed, it may be one which in actuality barely
exists.
The delineation between decision and effects bargaining, as has
been noted, was first made by the Board in Fibreboard I in order to
isolate determinations regarded as inherently entrepreneurial from the
reach of the duty to bargain, and hence from employee influence. The
Court's First National Maintenance opinion strongly resembles this ef-
(6th Cir. 1974), in which the court stated that "claims of non-competitiveness ... are the
equivalent of the claims of inability to pay the wages demanded in Truill." Id at 751. In Good.
year, the company had requested that the union engage in mid-contract negotiations and consider
decreases in wages that were necessary for the company to remain competitive.
98. Eg., American Needle & Novelty Co., 206 N.L.R.B. 534, 84 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1526
(1973). When the employer's counsel informed union representatives that the company's Chicago
plant was being closed because it was not making enough money, the Board ordered the employer
to furnish information "pertinent" to its claim. Id at 545. Similarly, in Royal Typewriter Co.,
209 N.L.R.B. 1006, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1501 (1974), enforcedasmod#F ed, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir.
1976), the Board concluded that the company violated the Act by failing to respond to various
union requests for information, like financial data, that was necessary for the union to bargain
meaningfully over the company's decision to close one of its plants. See also Brazos Elec. Power
Coop., Inc., 241 N.L.RB. 1016, 101 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1003 (1979), enforced, 615 F.2d 1100 (5th
Cir. 1980).
99. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 253 F.2d
149 (7th Cir. 1958).
100. 542 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1976).
101. Id at 638.
102. 652 F.2d 1055 (1st Cir. 1981).
103. id at 1085.
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fort by reading into section 8(d) an exclusion for economically moti-
vated partial closing decisions. The opinion tries to demark a bright
line between managerial prerogatives and the statutorily guaranteed
rights of employees. The degree to which the two can be segregated,
however, seems problematic.
The goals of decision and effects bargaining are essentially identi-
cal: to afford the affected employees' bargaining representative notice
sufficiently in advance of the implementation of an operational change
to permit the union the opportunity, through bargaining, to preserve
jobs and otherwise protect the interests of employees. Further, their
mechanical features are alike. Within their respective spheres, the
scope of bargaining is equally broad, and in both, the union has the
right to secure information under the employer's control which the
union needs in order to bargain intelligently. Finally, and most criti-
cally, the duties attach at virtually the same time, i.e., sufficiently in
advance of the implementation of a change as to permit the union a
"meaningful opportunity" to bargain. In the final analysis, the differ-
ences between the two duties seem more of degree than kind. The em-
phasis in decision bargaining is on an exploration of alternatives which
the employer may find attractive enough to forego the contemplated
change. In effects bargaining, the focus is on ways to ameliorate the
impact of the change's execution, particularly through discussions con-
cerning opportunities for continued employment for affected workers at
the employer's other facilities. The duties then, are actually variations
on a theme.
In theory, the cases envision decision and effects bargaining occur-
ring in sequential, isolated phases. However, because "effects are so
inextricably interwoven with the decision itself," there seems no way to
prevent bargaining over the former from having an impact on the lat-
ter.1 4 Because the First National Maintenance opinion has upheld the
duty to effects-bargain, its impact on the ability of unions to protect
employee interests may be less than first expected. The consideration
of a hypothetical partial closing situation may aid in illuminating this
point. An imaginary business enterprise, the "Mas Corporation," oper-
ates three plants at which it produces components used in the manufac-
ture of automobiles. In order to reduce its costs, Mas has decided to
consolidate its operations and to close its plant I, the eldest and least
profitable of its three facilities. Prior to First National Maintenance,
Mas' duties, at least under the Board's general rule, would be as fol-
lows: upon reaching its decision to close plant I, Mas would have to
notify the union representing the employees at that facility, Local One,
104. Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d at 736 n.91 (quoting Ozark Trailers, Inc.,
161 N.L.R.B. at 570, 63 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1269).
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of its contemplated plan. As seen, such notice would have to be given
before Mas was irrevocably committed to effectuating the plan, and
sufficiently in advance of the closing to permit Local One an opportu-
nity to study the situation and to formulate suggestions as to possible
alternatives. At the union's request, of course, Mas would be under an
obligation to supply it with documentation concerning the plant's lack
of profitability, and other financial information the union might re-
quire to formulate proposals concerning severance pay, benefit contin-
uation, and, particularly, the opportunities for affected employees to
transfer to Mas' other plants. Bargaining would then proceed, during
which all aspects of the plan, including alternatives to its effectuation
and ways to ameliorate its impact, would be discussed. Only by consid-
eration of the costs of the plan's implementation could the amount to
be saved by the termination be ascertained.'
After First NationalMaintenance, Mas, of course, need not discuss
or consider any union suggestions as to alternatives to the planned clos-
ing, but must bargain about the effects of its decision. The Court's
opinion indicates that this bargaining must occur at a "meaningful
time," which, precedent indicates, is roughly contemporaneous with the
time at which the duty to decision-bargain attaches. It appears that
Mas would be under no duty to supply any information concerning its
decision, such as documentation concerning the plant's profitability."' 6
105. As the Third Circuit observed in Brockway Motor Trucks, even if a union is unsuccessful
during "decision" bargaining in convincing the employer to adopt one of its alternatives, it may,
through "effects" bargaining
still be able to avert the closing by convincing the employer that such a step would cost it
more in terms of post-termination expenses, as in severance pay, than it would save.
And even if the employer were to remain intransigent, the union could at least attempt to
make suggestions about the decision's timing and implementation in order to moderate
the closing's impact on the work force.
582 F.2d at 736. But see IAM v. Northeast Airline, Inc., 473 F.2d 549 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 845 (1972), a case arising under the analogous terms of the Railway Labor Act:
To allow the union to force a company to bargain about the effects of its management
decisions to the extent of forcing it to forego the proposed change in operations would be
in effect to take away from it the freedom to make the decision in the first place. We
have no doubt but that an employer, bargaining about the effect of a relocation on em-
ployment conditions, could refuse to discuss as unreasonable any labor protective terms
that would make it prohibitively expensive to move.
id at 558. Interestingly, Member Rodgers made a similar argument in his dissent in Fibreboard
II. There, he asserted that an employer should have no duty to bargain about either the decision
to subcontract or its effects. He contended that the decision to continue or terminate an operation
is a prerogative of management not subject to collective bargaining. To hold, therefore,
that an employer can be forced to bargain over the effects of a decision to terminate
necessarily renders that prerogative meaningless. For, obviously, to require an employer
to bargain over this aspect of his decision does not leave him free to make the decision;
in such a situation he is left, for all practical purposes, in no better position than he
would have been in had he been required to negotiate with the union the whole subject
of termination.
138 N.L.R.B. at 558 n.28.
106. See NLRB v. Gibralter Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 1091, 1096-97 (6th Cir. 1981) (no employer
duty to supply union with financial data on profitability and efficiency of plants; not relevant to
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Mas would, however, be obligated to supply Local One with other in-
formation pertaining to transfers, and financial information by which
the union could formulate economic demands concerning severance
pay, insurance continuation, and the like. Through such requests, the
union would probably be able to obtain most of the information to
which it would have had access prior to First National Maintenance.
Most importantly, because effects bargaining occurs prior to the imple-
mentation of a change, Local One, through the magnitude of its termi-
nation demands, might convince Mas that the continued operation of
plant I, possibly under altered conditions, e.g., reductions in rates of
pay or changes in contract terms concerning manning requirements,
would prove cheaper in the long run than closing the facility. Finally,
although the union could only insist on bargaining about effects, it
might nevertheless propose alternatives to the employer's plan and,
while not insisting to impasse over them, create sufficient pressure by
its "effects" demands to convince the employer to agree to discuss the
permissive topic of "decision." The point of this exercise is that, as a
practical matter, because the duties to decision- and effects-bargain at-
tach at the same time, their substance and results will be largely simi-
lar. The dynamics of bargaining will not permit the line between
decision and effects to stand unblurred.
The ultimate meaning of First National Maintenance is presently
unclear. As stated at the outset, much of its impact will depend upon
the breadth with which the Court subsequently construes the duty to
bargain effects. Several factors militate for an expansive reading. The
first is the Court's express recognition of the legitimacy of employee
interests in matters concerning job security. Such interests can only be
protected through effects bargaining which is broad in scope and which
will permit the union the opportunity to discuss "any and all" effects of
a partial closing decision, particularly opportunities for continued em-
ployment of the affected employees, or for their retraining and place-
ment with other employers. Bargaining limited solely to sterile
considerations of the "incidents of termination,"107 such as severance
pay, obviously will not serve to vindicate such interests, and will make
the Court's recognition of them an empty gesture. The second factor is
the history of the development of the duty through a long line of Board
and court decisions which, as seen, have uniformly indicated that the
duty to effects-bargain is catholic in scope and which, in accordance
with the Act's scheme of free collective bargaining, have consistently
declined to restrict the range of the duty to any set list of subjects. Fur-
subjects to be discussed in bargaining effects of economically motivated partial termination
decision).
107. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. (Fibreboard I), 130 N.LRB. at 1559 n.1, 47 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) at 1548 nl.
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ther indication of a broad construction of the duty lies in the manner in
which the Court's opinion was structured. In concluding that the Act
did not compel an employer to decision-bargain, the Court stated that
it found it "unlikely" that "requiring bargaining over the decision it-
self, as well as its effects" would "augment" the "flow of information
and suggestions" concerning alternatives to the closing, the adoption of
which would preserve unit jobs. It followed this statement by declaring
that there "is no dispute that the union must be given a significant op-
portunity to bargain about these matters of job security as part of the
'effects' bargaining" the Court concluded is required by the Act. Fi-
nally, it must be noted that by broadly construing the duty to effects-
bargain, the Court will not thereby make the union an "equal partner"
in the operation of an employer's business. The employer is always
free to effectuate its plan to shut-down, and the duty to effects-bargain
in no way interferes with the implementation of the managerial deci-
sion. The duty only requires that the employer notify the union in ad-
vance and, upon its request, discuss with the union ways to ameliorate
the impact of the change on the affected employees. Moreover, the
union's ability to block or dissuade the employer from implementing its
plan through the use of economic pressure will normally be minimal.
A strike in this situation will probably only convince the employer to
accelerate the closing, and will likely leave the employees with little but
the right to preferential hire should the employer re-establish its
operation.
Two closely related problems regarding the case's impact concern
the time at which the duty to effects-bargain will be held to attach and
the union's right in the course of such bargaining to obtain information
in the hands of the employer. The Court may, of course, eventually
hold that the duty to effects-bargain attaches only after the implemen-
tation of the change; it may also become more restrictive concerning
the tests to be applied in determining the union's right to secure infor-
mation in the effects bargaining context. As stated above, however, the
cases to date have been unanimous in holding that bargaining over ef-
fects, "in order to be meaningful," must precede the implementation of
the contemplated operational change. They have also been consonant
in liberally enforcing the employer's duty to disclose information to the
representative of its employees. If the Court was serious in its state-
ment that bargaining over effects is yet to be "conducted in a meaning-
ful manner and at a meaningful time," however, the likelihood of any
change in these requirements is small.
The First National Maintenance opinion represents an attempt by
the Court to protect management's ability to make basic en-
trepreneurial decisions free of employee influence. The line the Court
has struck between decision and effects bargaining, however, appears to
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be an illusory one. Much depends upon the breadth with which the
Court will subsequently construe an employer's duty to effects-bargain.
While it remains to be seen, precedent, the equities involved, and the
language of the opinion itself lead to the conclusion that the First Na-
tional Maintenance opinion will have only minor impact on the process
of collective bargaining, at least when skilled bargainers are involved.
